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A Modern History of Southeast Asia is a novel approach to recent Southeast Asian history. It approaches the subject from the perspective of local minorities which did not fit into the emerging nation-states. To some Southeast Asian nationalists, such an approach might appear heretical, for it flies in the face of nation building. In many Southeast Asian states, it is well known that not everyone wished to belong to the new nation. Nonetheless, Christie has given us an overview of the minority problem which has been partly absent until now.

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Southeast Asian history is a recently created field, barely a half century old. Like several Southeast Asian nations which emerged after 1945, it is to some extent intentionally created. There can be substantial differences between what Western historians and what Southeast Asian historians write about the region’s history. The former are foreigners while the latter have nationalist agendas or are circumscribed by local political conditions.
Many Southeast Asians who are historians are devoted to the nation building process and this colors their work, frequently weakening its quality. Hopefully, Southeast Asian historiography will at some point move beyond the Parson Weems and Washington Irving stage. Present day Washington scholars take their writings with a considerable grain of salt.
No nation emerges fully formed and a cohesive whole. Each nation evolves differently and rarely without growing pains. The latter can take the forms of civil war and revolution. Sometimes lesser protests occur. Some minorities are stuck with the new nation-state and can only bargain for better terms. Some could become viable states given the proper circumstances while others could not.
Christie chronicles a variety of minority peoples. These include the Penang Chinese, South Moluccans and Acehnese in Indonesia, the Karens and Arakanese in Burma, the Montagnards in Vietnam and the Malays of South Thailand. Many of these peoples enjoyed privileged positions in colonial times but were left high and dry by World War II and subsequent independence. Their unrest and rebellion became a means to solve this dilemma.
The Penang Chinese collaborated with the Japanese during World War II and felt abandoned by the British as independence neared in the 1950s. Feeling swamped in a Malay sea, they were in no position to start a violent rebellion and instead attempted to improve their situation via political organizations. After independence, their former autonomy was rescinded by the central government.
The Acehenese have a reputation of resistance to central government rule, whether Dutch or Japanese. In the case of the Indonesian Republic, Aceh hoped to be the link between the Malay world and the Middle EasL As it happened, Jakarta was less interested in external links than control over the sprawling Indonesian archipelago. The Acehnese revolted in 1953, but could not overcome the central government.
On the other end of Indonesia, the South Moluccans did not perceive themselves as Indonesians but at the same time they were unable to establish an independent state. Favored by the Dutch, but neglected by Indonesia, many linger in unhappy exile abroad. Perhaps of all the minority peoples, they have the greatest grievance against the colonial authorities. But like the Timorese, they can do nothing but endure rule from Jakarta.
Burma represents a more intractable problem as a newly independent nation. Historically, mainland Southeast Asian states have not enjoyed strong control over their mountainous regions and peoples. The fact that the Karens proved difficult to control should not be surprising. Part of this is due to the British colonial regime which treated the hill peoples differently. Their dependence on them during World War II exacerbated that problem which was then rendered more acute by independence in 1943. Arakan, which borders Bangla Desh, was long a crossroads. The Arakanese did not trust the central government while Rangoon could not control Arakan very well. Ultimately, the result was unpleasant for both sides.
It is safe to say the Montganards will probably always be unhappy living next to the Vietnamese. Strategically, Vietnam must control them. The Montagnards do not wish to be absorbed into Vietnamese society and must contend with the dangers posed by land shortage and overpopulation in lowland Vietnam. Like the Penang Chinese, they are in an unenviable position.
While approaching Southeast Asian history via its unhappy minorities (and there are many of them) is an interesting and useful approach, it does possess drawbacks. We should consider what will happen if disaffected groups gain independence. Southeast Asia could quickly resemble the Holy Roman Empire after 1648. With an increasingly aggressive China next door and a potentially aggressive India across the Bay of Bengal, such an eventuality could prove disastrous for the entire region. For better or worse, the various minority groups would do better to function within the existing nation-states.
The Muslim rebellion in the south was recently ended (at least for the time being) but it is one of the oldest secession movements in Southeast Asia. Juxtaposing it next to the other revolts would add some perspective to the entire panorama of minority discontent. Many books on Southeast Asia treat the Philippines in this manner the square peg in a round hole.
Clive Christie’s, A Modern History of Southeast Asia hopefully will spawn further works of this type. Perhaps someone else will examine the region’s history via its cities or via its senior national leaders.

Christie, Clive J. A Modern History of South-East Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996. 286 pp.